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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes migration streams within and out of the former USSR, here called 
Eastern Europe. It also discusses potential streams during the coming decades. The 
main part of the paper, however, is descriptive and builds on information from census 
data. 
A short historical part of the paper gives a background for the discussion on the character 
and form of present and future migration flows. A simple dynamic model of economic 
growth in two parts of Europe (Eastern and Northern/Western) show that the present 
welfare gap will continue to exist, even with a large capital transfer to Eastern Europe. 
A potential for large migration flows westward will thus be present even during the 
coming decades. 
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POVERTY, ETHNICITY AND MIGRATION POTENTIALS 
IN EASTERN EUROPE 
Sture oberg' and Helena ~oubnova~  
Geopolitical changes in Europe make it important to apply theories from both economic 
and social geography in order to prepare for future consequences of a new political order. 
Here we will apply them on migration from Eastern Europe, which here means the 
former USSR or Russian Empire, to other parts of Europe and on migration between 
nations or republics in Eastern Europe. 
A free mobility in Europe of production factors like capital and labor would, according 
to economic theory, lead to capital moving east and people migrating west. The potential 
strength of these flows and how they are encouraged or opposed by important actors is 
one aim of this paper. The other is to understand the ongoing restructuring of the 
population within Eastern Europe with special attention on the prospective 
homogenization between ethnic and territorial distribution of nationalities. How could 
increased freedom in the political system affect migration? Both voluntary and forced 
migration have already increased and future mass migration flows might emerge. 
There is no way that science can be used to make a prognosis on future international 
migration flows. Migration flows between countries are regulated but rules change, and 
sometimes the streams cannot be controlled by rules. Many actors are involved in the 
emergence of the new geopolitical map of Europe, and even with a deterministic 
approach--which we do not have--it would be impossible to estimate a model of the 
complex dynamic system affecting international migration. 
This paper will therefore not try to estimate future migration streams within or out of 
Eastern Europe but discuss the potential streams that could occur during some scenarios 
of political and economic change. The main part of the paper will, however, be 
descriptive and build on information from USSR census data. For a specialist on Soviet 
population geography there will be very few additions to existing knowledge on empirical 
data. The only so far unpublished data (as this paper is written in 1991) will be on 
contemporary emigration. Also the discussion on future migration streams is to be seen 
as a first attempt to find reasonable figures on reasonable scenarios, not an effort to 
make a prognosis. 
'International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria 
2~emographic Institute for Social and Economic Studies of Population, Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 
Russia 
1. BACKGROUND, DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
Three out of ten Europeans live in the European part3 of the former USSR. These 
around 200 million inhabitants in "Eastern Europe" belong to a large number of ethnic 
groups having their own history and languages (see Figure 1). It is of course not easy to 
define a language, but officially 70 languages are spoken in Eastern Europe. Newspapers 
are published in 50 (!) languages. The religious split is less dramatic than the linguistic. 
The Russian Orthodox Church dominates this part of Europe but substantial minorities 
are Muslim, Roman Catholic or Protestant. Officially four different alphabets 
(Russian/Cyrillic, Latin, Georgian and Armenian) are used in this motley crowd of 
populations. Today there are 17 "nationalities" (ethnic groups with the official status of 
nationality) in Eastern Europe that have more than a million members. 
Figure 1. Main geographical areas in Europe, 1992. The terms used are based on the 
cardinal points. In the literature there is confusion about most of these terms and some 
of them are by tradition very "political". 
As we all know, there have always been tensions and sometimes open wars between the 
different nationalities in Eastern Europe. Since the Middle Ages, the Russians have 
dominated both politically and culturally. Especially since the 16th century their 
influence has been spreading. Today, around 15 million Russians live in non-Russian 
parts of Eastern Europe. Their "historical rights" to live outside Russia are being 
discussed and will continue to be so during the coming years and decades. When other 
large empires lost their power, like the British in India or the Ottoman in the Balkan, a 
%ere we will not deal with the more than 90 million inhabitants living in the Asian part of the former 
USSR. We have included the Caucasus area in the European part of the Union. Praxis differs on this point. 
Traditionally the Caucasus is geographically outside Europe, although ethnically parts of the Caucasus are 
typically European. Georgians and Armenians are Semitic Christians, and Azerbaijanis are Semitic Muslims. 
For practical reasons the whole area is sometimes, as in this chapter, included in Europe. 
return migration of the ruling class to their homelands occurred. Will we see the same 
process now in Eastern Europe? 
The Russians form the major ethnic group, about 115 million, in Eastern Europe. They 
are also the largest ethnic group in Europe as a whole. Other large groups are the 41 
million Ukrainians and the 10 million Byelorussians. All three groups are Slavic. 
Some groups are classified as foreign because their historic origin is a territory which 
today is a sovereign nation. They are of course also potential emigrants. The foreigners 
in Eastern Europe are, for example, Germans, Jews, Poles, Koreans, Turks, Hungarians, 
Greeks and Rumanians. Ethnicity is officially registered in a passport. Every citizen 
above the age of 16 must have a passport where the "nationality" (like Russian, German, 
Jew or Tatar) is registered, irrespective of place of residence. I£ someone wants to 
migrate and work in another region, a document from the new employer and the passport 
must be presented to the local police who then will register the move. When two persons 
with different ethnic backgrounds (e.g. a Russian and a Georgian) have a child, the child 
can choose ethnic membership at the age of 16. As we will see later in the paper, these 
choices change over time depending on the relative status of different nationalities in 
different parts of Eastern Europe. It also means that a person belonging to the Russian 
ethnic group (according to the passport) could have 50 percent Jewish '%blood". The 
potential migrant stream to Israel is thus larger than the number of people registered as 
Jews in Eastern Europe. Also 25 percent Jewish or German '%blood" will qualify for 
immigration visas to Israel or Germany. Also some other relations to a Jewish person 
or belonging to the Jewish religion will qualify. Later in the paper, we will try to 
estimate the size of the "foreign" ethnic population in Eastern Europe using different 
definitions. 
Statistical information on ethnic groups in different parts of Eastern Europe can be found 
in censuses from 1897 (the first census in the Russian Empire), 1926, 1937, 1939,1959, 
1970, 1979, and 1989. We will not use data for the countryside from the 1939 census 
because of its poor quality." We have assumed that the quality of the other census data 
is suitable enough for our purposes. As demographers are aware, in large countries (like 
the USSR or USA) there is always some uncertainty because people do not live where 
they are registered, some try to hide, and there are also practical problems in getting the 
statistics correct. In the censuses, nationality, native language, second language, and 
place of birth are registered. From 1926, 1937, 1959 and onwards it is possible to map 
"mixed" individuals whose native language do not coincide with nationality. 
Existing statistical sources do not allow a study of migration streams for nationalities. 
Some indirect information of net migration figures could be obtained from a cohort 
enumeration in the censuses. The only source for contemporary ethnic flows is from the 
4~talin was not happy with the census in 1937, so he ordered a new census which was completed in 1939. 
However, the latter did not please him either, so very few results were published. In the 1937 data, which is 
now being published in Moscow, it was possible to see all the losses in the countryside due to hunger or 
famine after the collectivization efforts (see, e.g., Tolz 1991). Thus he classified the data and sent most of the 
civil servants who had been working with the census to concentration camps. 
last census, 1989, where, as earlier, there was a question on moves during the year before 
1988. 
The short historical description in the next section is based on common knowledge from 
historical books published outside Eastern Europe (e.g. White 1990; Encyclopedia 
Britannica 1973; La Grande Encyclopedie 1976; Meyers Enzyklopadisches Lexikon 1978). 
Modern Russian books, written before perestroika, give very inaccurate and biased 
historical overviews. 
Mass migration is here used as a more popular word for large migration flows between 
areas with different cultures or sovereignty. Mass migration is often net-flows that change 
the spatial distribution of the population. If forty million Europeans (net) migrate to 
North America, then this is a mass migration. The same is true for more than 200 
million Europeans moving from the countryside and an agrarian life to the cities with 
their urban culture. Also smaller numbers can be regarded as mass migration streams 
if they comprise large proportions of the population. After the Second World War, 
250,000 Finns moved from Karelia to Finland, and during the following decades the same 
amount (net) moved from Finland to Sweden. Also these streams are here regarded as 
mass migration. 
2. HISTORY 
The history of Western and Eastern Europe differ in many respects. Some would argue 
that differences in physical conditions helped to create specific conditions in the two parts 
of Europe. In Eastern Europe, endless plains, low population density and lack of easy 
communication to other cultures first created many ethnic groups and then made it 
possible for one of them to dominate the whole area. The rivalry between Christian and 
Muslim groups in border areas also made it easier for the dominating Russian group to 
get support; otherwise, the alternative would have been domination by a power with a 
totally different religion. 
Others would argue that deep cultural differences made the lifestyle very different in 
Eastern Europe compared with the rest of Europe. Irrespective of the causes behind 
history we can describe some of the differences. 
For more than half of this century the political ideologies have differed, with state 
capitalism in the East--often labelled as people democracies--and with democracies in the 
West--often labelled as capitalistic societies. In the USSR, state planning was an 
ideology, or vice versa, the ideology was a complicated planning system, which first 
suppressed market behavior during the Stalin Era and later created corruption. However, 
the ideology did not work out to be efficient. In the West, the states built more physical 
and social infrastructures for their inhabitants, but this was never recognized in the 
political language as state planning. The different political systems resulted in both 
economic and human development in the West and in a stagnation of these aspects of 
life in the East. We will come back to the differences in welfare and standard as a cause 
for potential outmigration from the former USSR. In this section we will shortly run 
through the history of Eastern Europe with special attention to changes in the 
demographic composition of the population. 
build in^ the Empire 
Around the year 1000, the so-called Kiev-nation controlled an area from the Baltic almost 
to the Black Sea. Some hundred years later, the Mongols controlled large parts of this 
area. This Asian period lasted until 1480. The first Russian czar, Ivan IV who was 
crowned in 1547, conquered Tatar nations and expanded the territory to the Caspian Sea. 
He also began colonization in Siberia: parts of the Ukraine were included into Russia 
in the middle of the 17th century; areas along the Baltic coast, like Estonia in 1721; large 
areas along the Black Sea later during the 18th century, including Crimea in 1783; large 
parts of Poland before 1800; Finland in 1809; and the remainder of Poland in 1830. All 
the time new areas were included in Asia. A large powerful empire was created. Many 
ethnic groups were politically but not socially united. 
The physical expansion of the empire came to a halt around one hundred years ago: in 
southern Europe, in the Balkan, by the Berlin Congress in 1878; along the North 
American coast in 1867, when Alaska was sold to the USA; and in eastern Asia when 
Japan in 1904-1905 forced Russian troops to leave Manchuria. 
The Empire became weaker during the beginning of this century and was not successful 
during the First World War. As we all know the czar was overthrown in 1917 and Lenin 
became the new leader. Several ''white" generals with support from Western European 
countries and the USA tried to fight the communists, but they were defeated after some 
years of civil war. The USSR, the new empire, was formally created in 1922. The size 
of the new union was smaller in Europe than the old Russian Empire, and areas like 
Finland and the Baltic states became independent and sovereign nations. 
During its history, Russia has taken measures to encourage migration. Like other 
"peripheral" countries, it needed technology and human skills to build its strength. In 
1763, Katherine the Second wrote an edict "About permission for all foreigners to settle 
where they want to live". Immigrants received privileges like tax release during the first 
ten years and freedom of confession. They were also spared from military service. This 
migration policy led to large immigration flows. In total, more than four million 
foreigners lived in Russia one and a half centuries later. The largest group were the 
Germans, with more than two million. The assimilation of foreigners during the last 
century (and even later) was slow, partly because they were prohibited to marry a person 
from another ethnic group with a different religion without converting. 
During the last part of the 19th century, small groups of East Europeans started to 
migrate to North America (Janovskij 1909). In 1870 less than one percent of the 
immigrants to the USA was from Eastern Europe. These immigrants were important 
because they transferred information of a rich land with political freedom back to the 
mother country and thus prepared the way for future large migration streams. After the 
turn of the century every fifth immigrant to the USA was East European. The large 
immigration waves thus came in the beginning of the 20th century; the numbers are 
shown in Figure 2. The ethnic composition of the immigrants from Eastern Europe is 
interesting: only one out of twenty was Russian; nearly every second was a Jew (see 
Figure 2). The estimated proportion of returning migrants was usually very low, but there 
is one ethnic group where it was very high: around 30-40 percent (in 1908-1911 it was 
37 percent) of the Russians moved back to Eastern Europe (Patkanov 1911). 
Emigrants 
19W 1902 1904 1906 1908 1910 1912 1914 
Year 
Figure 2. Ethnic composition of migrants from Russia to the USA, 1900-1913. 
Probably the main reason for the ethnic composition of the immigrants is that Russia 
changed its migration policy during the last years of the 19th century and encouraged 
outmigration from Russia of non-Russians (Obolenskij 1928). At the same time, Russians 
were encouraged to migrate within the Empire, preferably to border regions and Siberia. 
Non-orthodox groups, like the Poles or Jews, were not treated like the Russians. For 
example, only Orthodox Christians were given land for farming in Kazakhstan and 
Siberia. 
A new emigration wave from Russia took place during the civil war. Between two and 
three million left the country and moved to France, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Turkey 
and China As of 1926 emigration was not allowed. 
In the Old Empire another interesting process took place: temporary and seasonal 
migration across the border areas. For example the population on both sides of the 
Russian-German border were Polish. There was a shortage of rural workers and higher 
salaries on the German side of the border. Illegal border crossing for work in Germany 
became more and more popular, and it was later accepted as legal if the workers moved 
back to Russia during the winter. 
Within Russia people were often stimulated to move. Originally non-Orthodox Christians 
and also unaccepted reforrnist-Orthodox, often moved to border areas. Also many 
conventional Orthodox Christians continued this process, including to areas in Kazakhstan 
or Siberia, where they received land and release from taxes if they contributed to the 
defence of the temtory. One probable idea was to get a Slavic majority in all parts of the 
Empire. This policy was successful except in the Baltic and Polish districts, where only 
around one-tenth of the population was Russian Orthodox according to the 1897 census 
(see Appendix Tables A1 and A2). Also in the Caucasus, the proportion of Russians was 
low. Another resettlement wave occurred from crowded areas in Middle Russia to virgin 
land east of Moscow. 
The Stalin Era 
Stalin, or Josef Vissarionovich Dsjugasjvili, born in Georgia in 1879, succeeded Lenin in 
the beginning of the 1920s and secured a personal powerful position in the USSR. Some 
years later he became an absolute ruler with total control over life and death in the 
whole empire until his death in 1953. He had a well-known interest in ethnic questions 
following his position in 1917 as a commissary for nationalities. Some of the ethnic 
structural changes during his regime are due to his personal will. 
One of his early decisions was to transfer control over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, 
inhabited by Armenians, to Azerbaijan and also to create a buffer strip of land that 
would separate the region from the Armenian Republic. The historical background to 
this decision is said to have been quite complicated but the resulting conflicts have 
become very violent during the last years. Most Armenians are Christians; most 
Azerbaijanis are Muslims and speak a Turkic language. Many Armenians see them as 
successors of the Turks who were responsible for genocidal attacks on Armenians in 1915. 
Stalin expanded the physical borders of the Empire substantially during the Second 
World War both in Asia and Europe. The borders of the old Russian Empire were 
restored again. In Europe he occupied Eastern Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
in 1939 and kept these areas after the war in 1945. He also conquered around ten 
percent of the Finnish territory. After the war Byelorussia and Lithuania were expanded 
westward. The Ukraine was also expanded by incorporation of Polish, Czechoslovak and 
Hungarian areas. Kaliningrad (former Kijnigsberg) was taken from the Germans, and 
finally Moldavia, a part of Rumania since the Russian civil war, was again made part of 
the USSR. The new Soviet Union after the war was even somewhat larger than the old 
Empire, consisting of ten republics in the European part of the union: three Baltic, three 
Slavic, Moldavia and three Caucasian republics (see Figure 3). It is this area which here 
is called Eastern Europe. Outside the Union he created a border district with depending 
nations, from Finland in the north over Poland, the former GDR, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, and Rumania to Bulgaria in the southeast. 
Figure 3. The European part of the USSR (1923-1992) consists of ten republics since the 
Second World War (1945). 
During the Stalin Era, the Union was industrialized and urbanized. Urbanization could 
be said to be the largest global mass migration phenomenon of this century. A large part 
of the world's population changed both type of settlement and life style. Often 
urbanization is a local or intraregional process, but in Eastern Europe it has, to some 
extent, also been interregional. Many rural groups during the Stalin Era were sent or 
moved to cities in Siberia. The urbanization during the Stalin Era was however not as 
rapid as it became during the 1960s and 1970s (see Table 1 and Figure 4). One reason 
for this was that the population living outside cities did not have passports and therefore 
could not move without prior permission. When Stalin came to power, two out of ten 
inhabitants in Eastern Europe lived in cities, and when he died the figure was five out 
of ten. At present there are 18 cities in the European part of the USSR, with 1 million 
inhabitants or more, and 20 cities with 0.5-1.0 million inhabitants. 
Table 1. Population (in thousands) in major cities in the European part of the USSR in 
1939, 1959 and 1989. The location of the cities is shown in Figure 4. 
Moscow 
St. Petersburg 
Kiev 
Baku 
Kharkov 
Minsk 
Nizhni Novgorod 
Sarnara 
Odessa 
Dnepropetrovsk 
Tbilisi 
Yerevan 
U fa 
Donetsk 
Kazan 
Perm 
Rostov-on-Don 
Volgograd 
ST. PETERSBURG 
KIEV KHARKOV 
VOLGOGRAD 
Figure 4. Major cities in Eastern Europe (the former European part of the USSR). 
The movement of ethnic groups in Europe at the end of the Second World War was 
substantial. The usual figure tells us that 25 million Europeans changed national location 
just after the war. Half of them moved to non-communist countries, especially West 
Germany. All of these movements made it possible for Poles and others to occupy 
"empty" temtory and capital. People from the Baltic states fled to Sweden and other 
western countries. Many were moved because national borders changed, e.g. Poland got 
some of the German temtory in compensation for some of its eastern territory which was 
transformed into USSR-temtory. During and after the war Russians were moving into 
new temtories in the Empire: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kaliningrad, and Poland. Many 
former Jewish places in Eastern Poland and the Ukraine were empty since all inhabitants 
had been killed by the Germans; they now became Russian. Several ethnic groups were 
moved from their home countries into Russia. Stalin wanted more people in Kazakhstan 
so he moved Germans from Volga and Tatars from Crimea to colonize new areas in the 
east. He also wanted more people in Siberia so he prolonged his earlier policy to have 
large concentration camps there for unwanted groups. 
As mentioned above, urbanization was the largest resettlement process during the Stalin 
Era. As indicated earlier, involuntary settlement in new areas, most often outside Europe 
and often in concentration camps, was also a sizable part of this process. The numbers 
involved in this sad part of the Soviet history are discussed. A crude Russian estimate is 
30 million totally resettled, including the 12 million that were killed or died in the camps. 
This figure could be low; figures twice as large are also mentioned (e.g. by Soljenitsyn). 
Of all Eastern Europeans born between 1880 and 1920, five to ten percent belonged to 
the group of forced migrants. 
One could say that during the Stalin Era, there were two categories of forced migrants. 
First, the non-conformists, e.g. people with the wrong attitude toward communist ideas 
like the farmers who did not like collectivization of land in 1929 and people belonging 
to the wrong social class, group or socialist party (1922 and onwards). The same groups 
were later forced to move from the Baltic states, Eastern Poland, Western Ukraine and 
Moldavia (1939 and onwards). Other groups that had to move to concentration camps 
were collected in areas that had been occupied by the Germans during the Second World 
War. Also Soviet soldiers from German prison camps were transferred to Soviet camps, 
mainly in Siberia. 
The second category of forced migrants had to move because of ethnicity. Non-Russians 
like Crimea-Tatars and Greeks were moved from Crimea to Middle Asia. Around ten 
of the Caucasian nationalities were moved from Caucasus to Middle Asia. As already 
mentioned, Germans from Middle Volga had to settle in Middle Asia, Siberia and 
Kazakhstan. 
Emigration during the Stalin Era was regulated by an edict from 1926: it was not allowed 
and there were only a few exceptions (Raeff 1990). Immigration was allowed, but very 
few people moved into the USSR during this period, and those who did were mainly 
intellectuals from other parts of Europe. However Stalin did not trust them, and he 
usually had them killed. 
From S~rinp to Perestroika 
A few years after his death, Stalin was criticized as being inhuman, and a period of less 
repression started. The half of the population living in the countryside were given 
passports which increased their geographical mobility. There was no expansion of the 
Soviet territory, but military efforts were made both to control border areas (Hungary 
1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, and border fighting with China during 1969) and to support 
newly emerging allies (e.g. the Cuba incident in 1962 or the invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979). 
We have access to three censuses from the "spring period of 1959, 1970 and 1979, and 
one census from the early perestroika period of 1989. Some basic data for the republics 
in 1989 are shown in Table 2. The restructuring forces during this period were 
substantial. One of the many well-known migration streams consisted of young Russians 
and Ukrainians moving to Kazakhstan. Instead of modernizing the countryside--including 
the agriculture--in Russia and the Ukraine, the communist party invested large amounts 
of resources to develop new farm land in, e.g., Kazakhstan. Today this has contributed 
to the well-known problem in the old countryside: poor living conditions and an aging 
population. 
Table 2. Inhabitants, population density and share of non-nationals in Eastern Europe 
in 1989. 
Population, Population density, Share of non- 
1989, average distance* nationals, 1989, 
in millions in meters in percent 
Russia 147.0 232 19 
Ukraine 51.5 119 27 
Byelorussia 10.2 157 22 
Moldavia 4.3 97 36 
Estonia 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Georgia 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
The number of inhabitants/km2 is not a very useful figure because we do not know from our everyday 
experience how big a square kilometer actually is. Average distance, ud, is defined as the average distance 
between individuals if the whole population in a region is equally distributed over the whole area. In the 
whole of the USSR, ud is around 300 meters, in the UK it is 70 meters, in Germany 73 meters and in France 
107 meters. 
A summary of how the balance between different ethnic groups have changed during 
1959-1989 is shown in Table 3. The data are from the whole USSR, including the Asian 
part, but only nationalities with more than 100,000 members in Europe in 1959 are 
included. The groups are ranked according to their rate of change. Five groups have 
decreased--the number of Jews by as much as 36 percent. All of the 26 other groups 
have increased. Five of them have doubled during the three decades--the Gypsies, 
Kabardinians, Azerbaijanis, Chechens and Dagestanis. 
Table 3. Nationalities in Eastern Europe, their numbers in 1989, and the rate of change, 
percent, since 1959. 
Nationality* 
Jews 
Finns 
Karelians 
Poles 
Mordvinians 
Estonians 
Latvians 
Hungarians 
Bulgarians 
Greeks 
Ukrainians 
Udmurts 
Chuvash 
Germans 
Byelorussians 
Russians 
Lithuanians 
Tatars 
Rumanians 
Koreans 
Ossetians 
Bashkirs 
Georgians 
Moldavians 
Gagaus 
Armenians 
Kabardinians 
Gypsies 
Dagestanis 
Chechens 
Azerbaijanis 
Population 
in thousands, 1989 
1,449 
67 
13 1 
1,126 
1,154 
1,027 
1,459 
171 
373 
358 
44,186 
748 
1,842 
2,039 
10,036 
145,155 
3,067 
6,489 
146 
439 
598 
1,449 
3,981 
3,352 
198 
4,623 
391 
262 
2,065 
957 
6,770 
Population change 
1959-1989 in percent 
-36 
-28 
-22 
-18 
-11 
+4 
+4 
+ 10 
+ 15 
+ 16 
+ 19 
+ 20 
+ 25 
+ 26 
+ 27 
+ 27 
+ 32 
+ 32 
+ 38 
+ 40 
+ 46 
+ 47 
+ 48 
+ 5 1 
+ 60 
+ 66 
+ 92 
+ 99 
+ 118 
+ 128 
+ 130 
Some figures measure the numbers in the whole of the USSR, including the Asian part. The table includes 
all nationalities having more than 100,000 members in 1959. The "new" larger groups not included in the 
table are the Turks (208,000 in 1989) and the Kurds (152,000 in 1989). 
Larger areas with majorities from a specific ethnic group are shown in Figure 5. Here 
some smaller groups of less than 100,000 members are visible. 
Figure 5. Ethnic composition in a part of Eastern Europe. 
From Perestroika to Sovereien Nations 
While writing this paper, several of the former republics of the USSR have become 
nations of their own. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were recognized as sovereign nations 
by both the USSR State Council in Moscow and by the European Community in Brussels 
in September 1991. Three months later, eleven Soviet republics signed up as founders 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States. A new union was created. The old, the 
USSR, voted itself out of existence on December 26,1991. The degree of independence 
among the independent states will take several years to sort out. 
Restructurin~ Forces 1959-1989 
Within a given territory, three factors can change the ethnic composition of a population: 
natural increase in different ethnic groups (number of births minus number of deaths), 
net migration of members in the ethnic groups (number of immigrants minus number of 
emigrant.) and assimilation between groups (reclassification of membership or biased 
classification of children in mixed marriages). 
Natural increase is usually the most important factor of change for large ethnic groups. 
Russians have fewer babies than most other ethnic groups, and as we know, any 
difference in fertility will, in the long run, change the power structure between ethnic 
groups. In some of the areas where large numbers of Russians have moved and become 
the majority, the situation has now changed because of different reproduction rates. One 
example of a surviving minority that already has formed a majority is the Tatars in one 
of the regions in the Middle Volga. 
I 
A study of the level of reproduction in the ten republics, using cohort data for women 
born between 1935 and 1955, show that on average, women in Russia, the Ukraine, 
Estonia and Latvia have had fewer children (10-20%) than the reproduction rate (2.1 per 
woman). Close to reproduction rate but not above are women born in Byelorussia and 
Lithuania. Some natural population increase (2.2 to 2.6) was true for Moldavia and 
Georgia, and a little more for Armenia. Large increases took place in Azerbaijan, where 
Muslim women had many children. However, during this period of two decades, the 
average number decreased substantially in Azerbaijan from 4.4 to 2.6 children per woman 
(Boubnova, 1989). The present and expected future population increases in Muslim areas 
are thus mainly due to the population structure. Many inhabitants are in age groups 
where they form families and have children. 
Mimation streams changed radically during the last years of the old regime. Before 1988 
there were no data on ethnic migration, but through indirect methods it is possible to 
make inference from spatial distribution data. One such source is a data base on cohorts 
every tenth year. Here, however, we will use the census data from 1979 and 1989, 
including the information on migration during 1988, which is available in the 1989 census. 
The first break in the old migration pattern shows that Russians return to Russia. 
Before, the Russians were moving to all parts of the USSR but during the last decade the 
opposite occurred: they returned from the Central Asian republics and from Kazakhstan. 
This movement increased during the last years before 1989 when nationalism grew in 
strength (see Appendix Table A3). The clear tendency became: Russians go home. In 
the Caucasus their numbers were reduced between 1979 and 1989 by 9 percent in 
Georgia, 27 percent in Armenia and 18 percent in Azerbaijan. 
The second variation is that Slavic people in general seem to stop their geographic 
expansion. Earlier also Ukrainians and Byelorussians were moving to other republics. 
Some examples from the decade 1979-1989 show that the number of Ukrainians 
increased by 34-39 percent in the Baltic republics, by 22 percent in Azerbaijan and by 35 
percent in Uzbekistan (see Appendix Table A4). For the USSR as a whole their 
numbers only increased by 4 percent. While Byelorussians increased 6 percent in the 
union, their numbers in Central Asia, Georgia and Azerbaijan increased by 50 percent. 
However during the last year of the period, in 1989, both Ukrainians and Byelorussians 
were moving back to their "homelands". 
The third deviation shows that the increasing strength of the Slavic population in the 
Baltic republics was coming to an end even before they became souvereign states. At 
least there were efforts made to restrict immigration. Russians, Ukrainians and 
Byelorussians were no longer welcome to settle there. The pull-factor in the Baltic areas 
is evident: a higher standard of living. In spite of a long tradition, around two centuries, 
of Russian supremacy over the areas, only one out of five inhabitants was "non-Baltic" 
when the USSR took control during the Second World War. After the war some Balts 
fled to the West, others were killed or moved eastward by Stalin and a russification 
process began, especially in the two northern Baltic states. It continued after the Stalin 
Era. Economic factors made it tempting for Slavs to move to Latvia and Estonia. The 
1989 census shows that in one (Latvia) or two (Estonia) decades the native groups would 
probably have become minorities in Slavic countries. This is one of many examples 
showing how geopolitical changes include both political change and consequences for the 
population geography. 
International migration is easier to control than internal migration. Outmigration from 
the USSR was nearly non-existent before perestroika: Between 1987 and 1990 the flows 
to non-USSR countries from the European part of the union have doubled every year 
(see Table 4). Also other short term flows of people working temporarily outside the 
union started when this possibility was allowed in 1987. 
Table 4. Migration flows from Eastern Europe to countries outside the USSR, 1987- 
1990, in thousands. 
Origin Republic in Eastern Europe 
Russia 
Ukraine 
Byelorussia 
Moldavia 
Estonia 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Georgia 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
The permanent outmigrants are usually Jews (Sabatello 1992) or Germans (Wendt 1991). 
Statistics for the destination of USSR immigrants (not only the European part) from 1976 
to 1990 (see Table 5) show that nine out of ten immigrants are Jewish or German, or at 
least have a close family relation6 to one of these groups. 
%he exceptions were mainly Jews. On average, nearly 25,000 per year were allowed to leave the union 
between 1976-1986. This corresponds to one person among 10,000 inhabitants in Eastern Europe per year. 
!It was only possible for non-Jem to get a Jewish registration in the passport if they used illegal 
methods. 
Table 5. Destination of USSR~ emigrants, 1976-1990, percent and thousands. 
Destination 
Israel 
Germany 
USA 
Greece 
Other 
Sum (%) 
In thousands 
Over the generations, cohabiting ethnic groups mix biologically and culturally. Small and 
geographically-spread groups usually disappear if they do not work hard to maintain their 
cultural identity. Assimilation processes in Eastern Europe today take place partly 
through intermarriages between groups. Some data on assimilation are presented in 
Appendix Tables A5, A6 and A7. Statistics on these assimilation processes are published 
for Jews, Germans and Poles. Indirectly through statistics on nationality and mother 
tongue, some conclusions can be made on assimilation among other groups. 
Statistics show that in 1988 only one-third (31%) of the Jews married another Jew in 
Russia. The corresponding proportion in the Ukraine and Byelorussia were around every 
second Jew (50% and 56%). In "mixed families it was common to give the children a 
non-Jewish nationality. The proportion of children in mixed Jewish families choosing a 
Russian, Ukrainian or Byelorussian nationality in 1989 were 95%, 94% and 93%, 
respectively. It is thus clear that large groups of Jews were assimilating into the Soviet 
society before the opportunities to migrate to Israel opened up. This could be explained 
in many ways: some feel more like Russians, for example, than like Jews; others prefer 
to be registered as Russians in the hope of gaining privileges or to avoid being on 
probation. 
Among German mixed marriages in Russia, a minority of the children (6 percent) choose 
German nationality in their passports. In Kazakhstan, where there are more Germans 
than in Russia, 24 percent of the children of mixed marriages choose German nationality. 
On average, Germans are much less assimilated than Jews, especially in the countryside. 
In the four republics or nations close to Poland, one out of five children born to Poles 
in mixed marriages choose Polish nationality. 
Statistics on mother tongue could also say something on how different groups have 
assimilated. They will also show that large groups of people are classified in a way which 
has more to do with *%blood and classification of earlier generations than the actual 
7These data are from the whole USSR. Around one-third of the immigrants, mainly Germans but some 
Armenians and Jews, are from Middle Asia. These figures show more Jews migrating to Israel than in reality. 
This was a way to hide the fact that Jews were allowed to migrate to the USA. For the year 1990, the 59% 
refers topermissioxq to emigrate. The actual percentage of emigrants to Israel that year was 46. 
culture to which they belong. In 1989, the share of people with another native language 
than their own, according to nationality were for some groups (percentages are in 
parentheses): Hungarians (6), Turks (9), Kurds (19), Rumanians (39), Koreans (50), 
Germans (52), Poles (69) and Jews (87). A large majority of the Jews did not use 
Yiddish in their homes. Every second person classified as German no longer used the 
Germzn language at home. 
3. CHARACTER AND FORM OF PRESENT AND FUTURE MIGRATION 
Lately there has been a large interest in present and especially expected future migration 
within and out of the former USSR (e.g. Grecic 1991). This section will first deal with 
potential ethnic migration within Eastern Europe and from Eastern Europe to other parts 
of the world, and then discuss future economic migration within and especially out of 
Eastern Europe. 
Eastern Europe Today 
As indicated earlier, in all parts of the former USSR there are now strong forces working 
for national or regional sovereignty. This could be the beginning of a more fundamental 
regionalization of the administrative power structure in Eastern Europe. In other parts 
of Europe, like Spain, former Yugoslavia and the Czech and Slovak Republics, this 
tendency of ethnic control over "homelands" is evident. In Eastern Europe there are 
enough Tatars, Chuvash, Chechens, Bashkirs and Moldavians to form small nations of 
their own like majority groups did in the new Baltic states. Also smaller groups could 
form nations or autonomous regions within federal states. 
For example, in the Russian part of the northern Caucasus we find Slavic Russians and 
Ukrainians, Caucasus groups, Turks, Armenians and smaller groups of Greeks, Jews, 
Kurds, and Assyrians. Just to give an insight to the ethnic problems that could emerge, 
we present a short overview of the nationalities living in this area. In one autonomous 
republic, Dagestan, people from more than 30 nationalities, including Avarks (500,000), 
Dargins (400,000), Lesgians (300,000) and Kumuks (300,000), belong to the 1.8 million 
population. In another autonomous republic, South Ossetia, we find Ossetians, who are 
mainly Orthodox but also Muslims. Checheno-Ingush, another republic, is mainly 
inhabited by Muslims (Synnit), Chechens and Ingush. The ethnic tension in this republic 
is large. The autonomous republic of Kabardino-Balkar and the autonomous region of 
Karachayevo-Cherkess are formed by two nationalities, Karachayevs (140,000) and 
Balkars (78,000), but they have the same language and are quite alike culturally. The 
same is true for the Circassians (500,000) and the Kabardinians (400,000), two groups 
living in separate settlements with different autonomies. Among other small groups are 
the Assyrians (26,000), who like several other groups have an interesting historical 
background: they are the successors of the powerful ancient Assyrians. Among "foreign" 
nationalities in the area we find Greeks, Kurds and Turks. 
The potential ethnic conflicts are numerous here (see Figure 6) as well as in many other 
areas in Eastern Europe. There are no good statistics on ethnic social unrest, violence, 
civil war, etc., but we know that a state close to civil war is evident in areas like the 
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above-mentioned South Ossetia in Georgia or Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. We also 
know that ethnic groups often dislike each other. 
There is a new problem which is an important indicator of ethnic conflicts in Eastern 
Europe: the appearance of large numbers of refugees. The official number in 1988-1990 
was 600,000, as registered by the State Committee on Labor, Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
KGB and the Defence Ministry. This figure accounts for 420,000 refugees from Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, 70,000 refugees (mainly Turks) from Uzbekistan, 9,000 Caucasians from 
Kazakhstan, and 75,000 Russian-speakers (often military personnel with families) plus 
25,000 other refugees from Baku. An unofficial estimate is one million refugees: 
including more Turks from Uzbekistan, Russians returning from Tajikistan, Kirghizia and 
Tuva, and some Russian-speaking groups from Azerbaijan and the Baltic republics. 
Potential Ethnic Mimation Within Eastern E u r o ~ e  
A rough estimate of potential ethnic problems could be based on the actual geographical 
distribution of minorities in Eastern Europe (see Table 6). An increase in Russian 
nationalism would make life harder for all minorities in Russia. Some of them, like the 
Baltic groups, have already net-migrated from Russia to their homelands. Others, like 
the Tatars, also have an autonomous republic where they dominate in numbers and 
therefore have some sort of homeland. Still others, like the Germans, are emigrating and 
current ideas of an autonomous German republic will probably not stop the out-migration 
of ethnic Germans. 
On the other hand, anti-Russian feelings in areas outside Russia could, depending on 
their strength, force Russians to "return home". A majority of the three million Russians 
in non-Slavic European nations, including 1.7 million .in the Baltic and 0.8 million in the 
Caucasus, could move back to their mother country in the same manner as the Turks left 
the Balkan, when the Ottoman Empire collapsed one hundred years ago. 
Anti-Muslim feelings are present in Russia, Georgia and Armenia as well as in other 
parts of Europe, and future conflicts including civil wars with large numbers of refugees 
are always a threat. 
%e figure also includes some 120,000-150,000 environmental refugees who had to leave the Chernobyl 
zone; they are not of direct interest in this chapter where we deal with ethnic and economic refugees. 
Table 6. Minorities in Eastern Europe (former European part of the USSR) in 1989, in 
thousands. 
Republics: Rus Ukr Bye Mol Est Lat Lit Geo Arm Aze 
Minorities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Russians 
2 Ukrainians 
3 Byelorussians 
4 Moldavians 
5 Estonians 
6 Latvians 
7 Lithuanians 
8 Georgians 
9 Armenians 
10 Azerbaijanis 
Tatars 
Chuvash 
Bashkirs 
Mordvinians 
Germans 
Jews 
Poles 
Majority group 119 38 8 3 1 1 3 4 3 6 
(in rnilliom) 
* The figure for the majority group is shown on the last line. 
Potential Ethnic Mimation from Eastern Europe 
Ethnic tension will also affect outmigration from nations of the former USSR (Oberg and 
Springfeldt 1991). For example anti-Jewish feelings, which exist in Eastern Europe, is 
one of the causes behind the migration of the Jewish population to Israel or another 
Western country. There are 1.4 million Jews in Eastern Europe and still another 0.1 
million (in 1989) in the Asian part of the former USSR. And as discussed above, if a Jew 
marries a nonJew (which is true for every second Jew), and if they have two children, 
then three more persons are allowed to emigrate, according to the present migration 
rules. The high rate of intermix between Jews and Slavs would, after a few generations, 
assimilate nearly all Jews. Now it is more probable that mixed couples and Slavic 
children of mixed couples will use the legal opportunity to emigrate. The possible 
number of persons wanting to move to Israel in the future could be anywhere from a low 
number to between two and three million. The unknown size of future outmigration is 
illustrated in Figure 7. 
Other actual and potential emigration groups to other parts of Europe are the Germans, 
Poles and Greeks. While the Germans in Asia (Kazakhstan, 1 million) have been less 
assimilated, the Germans in Russia (0.8 million) have had the same rate of assimilation 
with the Slavs as the Jews. A multiplier of two to three has to be applied to estimate the 
number of potential German emigrants. 
Emigrants 
I 
* -? 
\ 
\ 
\ 
Jews 
100,000 ? 
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 
Year 
Figure 7. The potential ethnic migration from Eastern Europe involves Jews, Germans 
and other groups. 
Not only groups with a "mother nation" outside Eastern Europe are probable ethnic 
migrants, but also groups with many relatives in other countries may migrate more easily. 
Statistics produced in the USSR (see Table 7) show how many relatives the main 
nationalities have in other countries. Russians in other countries, e.g. France and the 
USA, emigrated so long ago that their relations to former relatives in Russia are probably 
weak. The Ukrainians and especially the Balts emigrated only one or two generations 
ago and thus they probably have stronger relations. Armenians are another group with 
large proportions in welfare states outside Eastern Europe: ten percent of all Armenians 
live in the USA and four percent live in France. Azerbaijanis outside the former USSR 
are mainly neighbors living in Irak. 
Table 7. Number of "relatives" to main nationalities in Eastern Europe living outside the 
USSR in 1987. 
Russians 
Ukrainians 
Estonians 
Latvians 
Lithuanians 
Georgians 
Armenians 
Azerbaijanis 
Note: These statistics are based on census data from other countries, e.g. the USA. Byelorussians are not 
registered as an ethnic group or a nationality outside the USSR and thus there are no figures. Approximately 
one percent of the Byelorussians live outside the USSR. Moldavians are registered as Rumanians outside 
the USSR and hence there is no figure for them here. 
Future Economic Migration Within Eastern Europe 
Urbanization could increase if existing restrictions to move into the major cities are 
removed. For many years the living conditions, including medical care, education, 
ecology, the housing and labor markets, were much better in the large cities, especially 
in Moscow. 
To become a Muscovite in 1991 one had to: 
1. Be born in Moscow (the fertility level is low, 1.6 children per woman) 
2. Marry someone living in Moscow (30,000-50,000 in-migrants per year, often fictive 
marriages in spite of special rules to avoid this) 
3. Excel in certain professions (a small number of actors, engineers, scientists, etc., are 
allowed to move to Moscow every year) 
4. Be a temporary worker in an industry with a shortage of workers or where 
Muscovites do not want to work. This has been the most common way to enter the 
capital (according to one source, around 150,000 succeed every year to receive 
permanent residence after several years as a temporary worker). 
If free mobility would be introduced, large flows of in-migrants to Moscow could be the 
result. Also St. Petersburg (former Leningrad), capitals of other states and some more 
attractive cities today have the same restrictions and could, with new rules, attract large 
numbers from rural areas and from smaller cities and towns. 
Urbanization will continue. Today every third urbanite lives in a small city with less than 
50,000 inhabitants. During the last decades, a little less than one million (net) migrants 
per year in the whole union moved to cities. A little less than 800,000 moved to 
European cities. During 1989 the process slowed down by 15-20 percent. 
During the transition from a command economy to a market economy, some of the living 
conditions, like access to food, could be more complicated in large cities and thus, 
together with present restrictions on immigration, moderate the urbanization process. 
In the longer time perspective, the proportion of the population living in large cities will 
probably increase, as has happened earlier in the history of Western Europe. 
East-West Mimation 
The title of this paper uses the word "poverty" to indicate the difference in living standard 
between Eastern and Western Europe. In a global perspective, contemporary Eastern 
Europe is, of course, a rich part of the world with a comparatively well-educated 
population and an especially great production potential consisting of both human and 
natural resources (Alton et al. 1984). 
If we try to make some simple calculations of how Eastern Europe can improve the 
present standard of living, it is easy to see that very little can happen during the coming 
decades, even if a heavy investment program is implemented. 
Let us for example make some assumptions about the production system and standard 
of living in a typical eastern and western region. To make the model simple and easy to 
understand, we measure everything per capita and disregard labor. Everybody is thus 
assumed to have the same know-how, energy to work, etc. We also say that the same 
technology is available in the west and the east. More realistic assumptions would 
probably favor economic growth in the west. The economies are closed in order to 
simphfy the model. We also assume that the benefits of "capital", which here could 
include clean air and social infrastructure, have a direct impact on the standard of living. 
In most models this impact is measured through consumption, but here we will emphasize 
capital and thus choose this formulation. The following simple expressions will be used: 
c = I-R 
I = Q-D 
R = rC 
Q = q c a  
D = dQ 
S = S,+S,D" s3C 
where 
C = Capital stock 
c = s ~ t  = change in Cover  At 
8t 
I = Investments 
R = Depreciation 
Q = Prodaction 
D = Private and public consumption 
S = Standard of living 
If the value of the capital stock would be estimated at $37,500 per person in Eastern 
- 
Europe and four times as much ($150,000) in Western Europe, if r is 3.5% per year, if 
a is 6896, if b is 0.5, if k is 80, if s,, the basic standard for all individuals through their 
own work and pleasure outside the production system, is estimated at $5,000 per year in 
1990, if s, is 1% and s, is 5% per year, then the standard of living would develop 
according to Table 8 and Figure 8. 
Table 8. Assumptions about the production system and standard of living in a typical 
Eastern and Western European region. 
Eastern European Region Western European Region 
Standard of Value of Production Standard of Value of Production 
living "Capital" living "Capital1' 
Year $/cap/year $/cap $/cap/year $/cap/year $/cap $/cap/year 
1992 8,800 44,900 16,200 15,600 159,300 31,500 
2000 10,800 78,000 21,700 17,700 195,900 35,000 
2010 13,600 123,600 27,600 20,200 239,300 38,800 
This formulation of the changes in standard of living is not based on careful estimations 
of the variables and is therefore not scientific. We have also used a simplified version 
of a Cobb-Douglas production function instead of more sophisticated growth models. 
The idea is however not to make a good model, but to make transparent assumptions on 
some common-sense ideas of economies. We have tried several alternative9 (but less 
transparent) versions of the model and several alternative assumptions of the variable. 
The alternatives usually modelled larger differences between east and west than the 
presented model. The important conclusion is that all formulations had the same 
message: Even with large investments in social infrastructure (including education in e.g. 
9 ~ t  is easy for any social scientist to use software for dynamic modelling, like STELLA or ithink, and test 
other parameters. The increase in the production system in the USA between 1929 and 1982, due to capital 
and knowledge/technical development but not to labor, was around 1 5  percent per year, the same growth 
as in Northern and Western Europe in our example (Denison 1978,1985; Denison and Poullier 1%7). The 
scenario for Eastern Europe shows a higher growth. 
Growth without Transfer 
Capital in $ Standard in $ 
600,000 4o.m 
Growth with Transfer 
Capital in $ 
600.000 
Standard in $ 
4o,m 
Figure 8. Two scenarios for Eastern Europe and Northern/Western Europe during 100 
years. Above, according to assumptions in the text with no transfer of capital or labor. 
Below, the same assumptions but one percent of the production value in Northern and 
Western Europe is transferred every year to Eastern Europe as development aid. 
accounting and marketing), in physical infrastructure and in technology, it is impossible 
to reach the western level of standard of living during the coming decades.'' 
Transfer of capital from Western to Eastern Europe will, of course, help to develop the 
standard but not to an extent that will be noticeable during a short time like one or two 
decades. If countries in Western and Northern Europe would send one percent of their 
GNP per year, which they have promised but not done, to less developed countries, and 
these resources would be added to the performance of the production system in Eastern 
Europe, then the standard of living in Eastern Europe in our model would still be around 
44 percent higher in the west in 2010 instead of 49%. 
Capital streams are already existing. In late 1991, the Soviet Union owed Western 
creditors nearly 70 billion dollars" which is around $250 per capita. If this money is 
invested in infrastructure, etc., for future production, this will of course help the economy 
in Eastern Europe but it will take a long time before the progress will be visible. The 
amount is less than the "one-percent" transferred yearly as a gift from Northern and 
Western Europe in our scenario. 
If we would believe in theory, then the imbalance between capital and labor in the west 
(in our example Northern and Western Europe) compared with Eastern Europe could 
be corrected by a much larger transfer of capital eastward or a transfer of labor 
westward. If the difference in capital per labor ratio between east and west disappeared 
and if the figures in our model were accurate, then the transfer of labor (with families) 
westward should be in the order of five million persons per year during the coming two 
decades. The number of emigrants from Eastern Europe would then be ten times as high 
as the present figures. These figures are, of course, hypothetical. In reality these flows 
would not be accepted (Bovenkerk et al. 1990,1991; Brubaker 1989,1990; Janoski 1990). 
For example, the amount of social engineering necessary to avoid conflicts between 
immigrants and others does not exist. This is why the iron curtain has now been replaced 
by a welfare curtain, preventing large migration streams westwards. 
East-West "Commuting" 
For most citizens, it is not possible to migrate permanently from Eastern Europe. It is 
not easy to get permission to leave or to be accepted in another country as an immigrant. 
There is, however, another possibility to leave the country: by private invitation from a 
person outside of the union. This method has been allowed since 1987 and practiced 
since 1988. New laws allowing people to leave without invitation are expected as of 1993. 
During such a visit to the West, it must be very tempting to work legally or illegally some 
hours, a week, a month or longer. The international value of the ruble is so low that any 
' O h  reality there is a danger, which is true for all countries, that people want to consume more and 
invest less, which would lead to a much p r e r  future than in our scenarios. 
''~ccordhg to Viktor Gerashchenko, President of the Soviet Central Bank, AP Reuters, 25 September 
1991. 
income in foreign currency is extremely valuable. If, for example, a Russian professor 
gave a two-hour lecture in Sweden in 1991, he or she could change this income (US$ 
150) into as many rubles as a yearly income in Moscow. If a visitor to Vienna works hard 
cleaning windows during one week, this will correspond to a yearly income in Eastern 
Europe. The official exchange rate has been changing every third or fourth month on 
average during the last three years and it will probably change many times in the coming 
years. But the basic large difference in salaries will continue to exist for at least one 
generation. 
The ratio between emigrants and short-term labor, including students and researchers 
with temporary grants, visiting other countries is estimated at one to five. This means 
that around 2.5 million visitors to the West every year are working on a short-term basis. 
This figure will probably increase in the future. When more people in the East get 
information about the advantages of a short work period in a rich country, they will find 
a way to use these opportunities. Also many actors like households, firms, hospitals, 
research centers, etc., would like to employ cheap temporary labor. Each year more 
information is spread on how to overcome the existing restrictions on mobility. 
We could learn from history that temporary migration, like the Russian-German illegal 
and legal seasonal migration in the old Empire one century ago, will develop when the 
advantage for all involved is substantial. History also shows that organizations will 
develop "travel agencies" to help an employer in a rich country find employees from poor 
countries, as was the case during the migration from Europe to North America one 
century ago or the present "temporary" migration from Asia to Arab countries. Extensive 
East-West "commuting" is thus a very probable alternative to large permanent migration 
from Eastern Europe. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The geopolitical changes in the former USSR are in a flux and as we write this paper, 
the number of nations emerging from the former union is still unclear. Two things are 
however clear. First, there is a large gap between the former union, here labeled Eastern 
Europe, and the rest of Europe. Under market conditions, there is a huge temptation 
for capital to move eastwards, where the salaries are low, and for labor to go west, where 
the salaries are high. Second, ethnic tension among a large number of nationalities is 
today shown openly, and conditions close to civil war are apparent in several regions. 
Both of these conditions give rise to migratory flows. The potential strength of these 
flows is tremendous. 
The ethnic migration of Jews, Germans, Greeks, and Armenians will probably continue, 
partly because of ethnic reasons but also because of economic reasons. The potential 
number of other migrants from Eastern Europe would be quite large--many millions per 
year--if economic conditions determined migration. In total the economy of Europe 
would be better off if around half of the population in Eastern Europe were welcomed 
in other European countries. This figure is of course very superficial. It has nothing to 
do with the real world. Large migration flows would cause many problems like 
braindrain in the East and social unrest in the West. But a reasonable yearly flow of 
people westward and increased economic help going eastward will increase economic 
growth in Europe as a whole. The present welfare gap between east and west will exist 
for one or two decades also with these flows. 
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APPENDIX. Tables. 
Table Al. Distribution of population by religious groups in the Baltic Republics in 1897, 
in percentages. 
Orthodox Catholic Protestant Jew 
Lithuania 17 33 2 44 
Latvia 12 12 60 16 
Estonia 17 2 79 2 
Table A2. Share of non-native nationalities in the Baltic Republics during the 1930s, in 
percentages. 
Year of Census 
Lithuania 29 1934 
Latvia 25 1938 
Estonia 12 1935 
Table A3. Main net migration flows of people belonging to different nationalities to and 
horn urban areas in European republics in 1989, in 1000s. 
Nationality 
Total 
Russian 
Ukrainian 
Byelorussian 
Georgian 
Azerbaijani 
Lithuanian 
Moldavian 
Latvian 
Armenian 
Estonian 
Tatar 
Jew 
German 
R E P U B L I C S  
Rus Ukr Bye Geo Aze Lit Mol Lat Arm Est 
103 57 14 -9 -19 0 -2 -3 5 1 
51 45 13 -4 -12 0 1 0  -3 1 
18 21 5 -1 5 0 1 -1 -1 0 
3 2 4 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
- 1 1 0 -2 67 0 0 0 -3 0 
- 1 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 -3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 7 1 0 -72 0 0 0 13 0 
- 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.2 
3 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-11 0 -10 0 -2 0 -5 -1 0 0 
-7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table A4. Changes in numbers of Russians and Ukrainians in the former USSR 
European Republics (in 1000s). 
1959 
Russians 
SSSR 
Russia 
Byelorussia 
Estonia 
Moldavia 
Latvia 
Ukraine 
Lithuania 
Armenia 
Georgia 
Azerbaijan 
Ukrainians 
SSSR 
Ukraine 
Latvia 
Estonia 
Lithuania 
Byelorussia 
Moldavia 
Armenia 
Russia 
Azerbaijan 
Georgia 
Table A5. Interethnic marriages of ethnic groups in the former USSR in 1985, percent 
of total population. 
Karelians 
Germans 
Jews 
Byelorussians 
Tatars 
Ukrainians 
Latvians 
Ossetians 
Moldavians 
Estonians 
Russians 
Lithuanians 
Armenians 
Georgians 
Azerbaijanis 
Table A6. Share of women in interethnic marriages in the former USSR in 1985, percent 
of total interethnic marriages. 
Russians 
Karelians 
Tatars 
Byelorussians 
Ukrainians 
Latvians 
Estonians 
Lithuanians 
Germans 46 
Moldavians 45 
Ossetians 38 
Jews 34 
Georgians 34 
Armenians 29 
Azerbaijanis 2 1 
Table A7. Nationalities in the former USSR speaking "their own" language in 1989, in 
percentages. 
Russians 
Azerbaijanis 
Georgians 
Chechens 
Lithuanians 
Estonians 
Latvians 
Hungarians 
Armenians 
Moldavians 
Turks 
Tatars 
Ukrainians 
Kurds 
Chuvash 
Bashkirs 
Byelorussians 
Bulgarians 
Mordvinians 
Rumanians 
Koreans 
Karelians 
Greeks 
Finns 
Poles 
Jews 
